

1970  
YEAR  
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SECURITY GRADING

N.B.  
UPGR

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SECRET

Contents checked  
for transfer to

D.R.O.

(Sgd.)

Date

26.7.

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.  
or POST

DEFENCE TRAINING AND SUPPLY

FILE No. DT 33/359/1 (Part )

TITLE: TRAINING OF ARMED FORCES FROM  
IRAQ IN UNITED KINGDOM UNDER U.K.M.T.S.

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Mr Packer.  
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Mr Packer

18

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9/3

Mr Hinchcliffe

18

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27/5

Mr Packer

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Mr Seaman. B.H.

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Mr Seaman

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Mr Hinchcliffe

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Mr Egeron NED

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Mr Egeron

M.D.

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SECURITY GRADING

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(10/4)



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BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

5 February 1970

(1)

separate

*M. J. J. J.*

Cd. you please consult Arabian and NA Departments and then discuss, in the light of anything they have to add.

*Be R 12/2*

Dear Geoffrey,

Military Courses in the U.K.  
for Arabs

*OK 2*  
*rec 10/6*

I have made a number of comments in despatches on what seems to me the over-rigid attitude in Whitehall both to the sale of sophisticated military equipment to Iraq and to the acceptance of Iraqis for staff and other specialised military training in Iraq. Most recently, in my despatch 10/3 of 24 January forwarding my M.A's Annual Report, I said I would be following this subject up in separate correspondence. This letter will be restricted to the second of the points mentioned (military training), not because I have meanwhile reached the conclusion that the objections of principle to selling sophisticated weapons to Iraq are fully justifiable after all, but because the issues involved are much more complicated; and since they concern expediency (notably over Iranian reactions) even more than principle, a letter simply questioning the principle is unlikely to have any effect. The same may be true over training courses but I have thought it worth trying.

2. The situation is that the Camberley and RAF Staff courses and other high-grade specialist courses in which Iraq and doubtless other Arab countries are interested, are graded confidential or above, while the security grading of Iraq and most other Arab countries (they vary, of course, marginally) is too low to qualify. The definition documents are M.O.D. letters 43/Gen/856 (SY 2 (A)) of 1 and 2 April 1969 and 79/Misc/1604 (SY 2 (A)) of 1 December 1969. (A list of recent Iraqi requests for courses, which have been turned down, is enclosed).

*Not surprising at all!*

3. As I see it, this stylised arrangement means missing valuable tricks unnecessarily. I am not, of course, suggesting that we should treat Iraqis and other Arabs as suitable recipients for highly classified military information - though at this point I cannot help observing with surprise that Israel receives a better security rating in the "League Table" than does any of our NATO allies. What I am suggesting is that our inability to accept intelligent and promising members

/of

G.G. Arthur, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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of the Iraqi (and other Arab) armed forces on such courses is (a) emphatically to our disadvantage and (b) could be overcome without security risks worth the name.

4. It is to our disadvantage because:

- (a) <sup>A</sup> In almost all Arab countries the Armed Forces play a central political role. The only way of influencing the future key figures in them in our favour is by sending the spot men for high-grade training in the U.K. There is ample evidence, even in Ba'athist Iraq, that those in positions of military authority well disposed to us are in general those who have had such training in the course of their careers.
- (b) In the military, as in the civilian field the continuing partiality of Iraqis for British products (when these are not ruled out by price, delivery dates, etc.) depends on the maintenance of a reasonable flow of carefully chosen Iraqis being trained in their respective specialities by us.
- A* (c) The fact that the Iraqis, at any rate, have repeatedly expressed their readiness to pay the full fee for such courses is not irrelevant. Even at this strictly practical level some advantage would surely flow from the attendance of fee-paying Arabs on such courses in reasonable numbers and thus enabling us, at no extra cost to ourselves, to maintain in operation training establishments on a scale which would be useful for our contingency planning but which would otherwise be beyond our means. *B*

5. As regards the security aspect at 3(b) above, the problem could surely be overcome by greater flexibility in organising these courses. Instruction on strictly confidential matters could surely be concentrated in the "fourth term" (or even in separate classes in the ordinary terms) which students below the relevant security rating would not attend. (Indeed, I drew the impression, when lecturing at Camberley last summer, that something of the kind was already the practice there and caused no difficulties.) Thus I am not suggesting that the full course should be down-graded: only that it would not be beyond the bounds of ingenuity to tailor existing arrangements

/to

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to meet a need which (if the arguments in paragraph 4 are accepted) it is in our interest to meet.

6. Perhaps I might add - and this is the only point which refers also to the second subject mentioned in paragraph 1 (the sale of sophisticated equipment) - that we surely underrate the efficiency of Soviet intelligence if we assume either that it would rely for military serious intelligence on ~~the~~ Arabs attending courses in the U.K. or that it would have to await the slow release of modern army equipment to Iraq before it succeeded in probing their secrets.

7. I can of course only speak for this post. Other Arab countries may not be as restricted as the documents quoted in paragraph 2 suggest: or our missions there may not be greatly interested. May I therefore leave it to you to decide whether it is worth consulting them? What does seem to this post to be of general concern is the tendency (which we presume to detect in London) to under-rate our residual "assets" in socialist Arab countries and to write down the potential value (in political no less than commercial terms) of these countries as trading partners. An old song, no doubt, but one that has a bearing on the subject of this letter (vide paragraph 4(b)).

*Yours are*

*John*  
(H.G. Balfour Paul)

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MILITARY COURSES FOR WHICH IRAQI  
REQUESTS HAVE BEEN TURNED DOWN

| <u>Course</u>  | <u>No. of<br/>Vacancies<br/>Asked For.</u> | <u>Ref. of Refusal</u>   | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|--|--|--|---|
| 1. Staff College, Camberley, 1970<br>Staff College, Camberley, 1971  | 2<br>2                                     | Addressed direct to Iraqis<br>by M.O.D. (Copy not yet<br>available)                |   |
| 2. R.A.F. Staff College,<br>Bracknell 69/70  | 1  | M.O.D. letter AF/14/2/ADT<br>(F and C) (RAF) dated<br>21 October 1969.             |   |
| 3. School of Artillery, Larkhill -<br>(a) Commanders and Staff Officers<br>All Arms Tactics<br>(b) Battery Commanders<br>(c) "Tactical Staff Duties"<br>(presumably Pre-All Arms<br>Tactics)<br>(d) Operations Artillery Intelligence<br>(e) Signals (RI)<br>(f) Signals (ARI) | <br>1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>1             | M.O.D. letter D/3855/FLS(A)<br>dated 30 September 1969.                            | (a) Demand<br>particularly<br>supported by our<br>DA/505 dated 17<br>September '69<br>to MOD (FLS)<br><br>(b) Only Courses<br>which will be<br>allotted at<br>S of A are<br>(i) SURVEY<br>(ii) YOs'<br>(iii) FACE |
| 4. R.A.F. Flight Safety  | 1  | M.O.D. letter AF/73/2/1/IRQ/<br>ADT (F and C)(RAF) dated<br>October '69 (no date). |   |



(WING SECRET)

(2)

Mr. Arthur



Reg A.

Mr. Balfour Paul's letter of 5 February on  
Military Courses in the U.K. for Arabs

I have circulated this to N.A.D. and Arabian Department. As regards courses, difficulties seem to concern Iraq and Sudan. Arrangements for other Middle East countries are reasonably satisfactory.

2. NAD and NED think it would be worthwhile asking MOD whether confidential matters could be fitted into a separate (fourth) term at Camberly, so that Iraqis and Sudanese could attend the other terms.

3. A general point is that we do not know the security grounds on which nationals of some Middle East countries are excluded. Nor are we consulted about the promotion/demotion in the security table of countries when sales of arms are considered. There seems to be a general bias against Republics, in favour of Monarchies etc., and in favour of Commonwealth against Non-Commonwealth countries.

4. Arabian Department has some points about secondment of British officers to forces in the Gulf etc. - I suggest Mr. Acland takes this up direct with M.O.D.

5. If you agree I will follow up the other points with M.O.D.

1. Mr. Burchard

A. B. P. as ex

I have written

u/b

J. P. Tripp

(J. P. Tripp)

2 March, 1970

2. Mr. Mac

A. B. P.

C. B. P.

J. B. P.

Mr. Tripp

Please act as suggested. I should like to see a list of security gradings, and who can attend Camberly & who can't, etc. Do not Defence Pol. Dept. know a good deal about this (I've done in my day)? X [A. also tell Mr. B. P. that we are tackling Mod on this.] We sd. aim ultimately at a meeting at my level if agreement is not reached below that

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P. 3/3



*Authy  
W/9/13.*

EN CLAIR

BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 134 14 FEBRUARY, 1970

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RECEIVED IN  
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DT 32/359/1

*① DT 6/1.*  
YOUR TEL NO 69.

TO KINSHASA; U.K. MILITARY TRAINING SCHEME.

OUR BID WAS SENT IN OUR TELEGRAM 910 OF 30 OCTOBER 1969  
AND IS CONFIRMED. OUR BID STANDS | WHETHER OR NOT COURSE  
CHARGES ARE RAISED.

*att'd.*

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

FILES

D.T.S.D.

D.P.D.

MR. GALLAGHER





(NEG 10/6)

R. P.W.  
Near Eastern Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

4

4 March, 1970

Military Courses in the U.K. for Arabs

Geoffrey Arthur has asked me to reply to your letter 10/4 of 5 February (1)

2. We have consulted other departments within the office and it appears that the Sudanese have encountered similar difficulties to those of the Iraqis. Arrangements for candidates from other Arab countries (the UAR is not interested) are reasonably satisfactory.

3. We are taking up the case of Sudan and Iraq with the Ministry of Defence and will ask them to consider the "fourth term" for Staff College courses - on the lines of your fifth paragraph. We will let you know how this goes.

(J. P. Tripp)

His Excellency  
Mr. H. G. Balfour-Paul,  
BAGHDAD

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DRAFT

LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

To:—

H.E. H. G. Balfour-Paul  
Baghdad

From

Mr. Tripp  
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

N.E.D.

Military Courses in the U.K. for Arabs

Geoffrey Arthur has asked me to reply to  
your letter 10/4 of 5 February.

2. We have consulted other departments within  
the office <sup>as</sup> it appears that the Sudanese <sup>have</sup> encountered  
similar difficulties to <sup>those of</sup> the Iraqis. Arrangements  
for candidates from other Arab countries (The UAR  
is not interested) are reasonably satisfactory.

3. We are taking up the case of Sudan and  
Iraq with the Ministry of Defence <sup>and</sup> ~~we~~ will ask  
them to consider the "fourth terms" for Staff  
College courses - on the lines of your fifth  
paragraph. We will let you know how this goes.

Mr. T. H. M.

in verbal  
to your minute  
on the 10/6  
below.

P. M. H. M. H. M.

4/3

Mr. MacRae

c. c.

2.3.

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
Confidential - Covering SECRET (5)

Reference

Defence Department (Mr. MacRae)

I would be grateful for your  
advice on the point raised by  
Mr Arthur in his ms. minute of  
3 March below.

Adm MacRae  
WB-D  
4/3



Mr Stephenson 5/4

Mr MacRae

✓ The list of security gradings is "Table X"  
a copy of which is attached (please return as it is  
my personal copy).

2. The security grading of all Staff Courses  
has recently been raised to Confidential. Up  
till last year the first and major part of the  
Cambridge course was rated "Restricted" so that  
countries with a low security grading could attend.  
I recommend that we should not ask MOD if  
they can revert to this system as it would  
certainly be turned down.

3. As can be seen from the explanatory notes  
on "Table X" (para 6) any proposal for disclosure  
of information above the levels set out in that  
Table have to be submitted to all members  
of the Release of Military Policy Committee on a  
Form C. It was this procedure which was  
adopted when we tried to get an Iraqi student  
on the Bracknell course - and when this was  
turned down I brought it up at the one of the  
regular meetings of the RMIPC, only to have it  
turned down again. The Service Security  
Departments require extremely strong arguments  
to make them relax the standards laid down  
in Column (6) of Table X.

4. With reference to Mr Tripp's para 3 of his minute of  
12 March




2 March, we are consulted (by Form C) together with all other RMPC members if it is proposed to supply military equipment to countries which do not qualify security-wise to receive such equipment. Whenever I receive such C Forms I pass them to the Geographical Dept. concerned.

J. Zouli

5/3/70

Dir. Dept.



4/3

4/3

Mr. Maclean

The list of security grounds is a copy of which is attached (please return as a copy of which is attached) (see personal copy) the document consisting of all staff names has recently been revised to reflect the fact that the first and major part of the country course was revised (revised) in that connection with a new security grading code table. I recommend that we should not add more of them can be used in this system as it would certainly be turned down. It can be seen from the explanatory note or Table X (Form C) and proposed for discussion of information above the fields set out in that table have to be submitted to all members of the House of Commons (including the Minister) as a Form C. It was the procedure which was adopted when we first got our security grading system - and when this was done I brought it up at the meeting of the RMPC, only to have it turned down again. The House is now considering the proposed security grading system. I make them aware of the situation and have in (column 6) of Table X. It will be seen that the RMPC have 31 members.



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Please return to CAPTAIN COLLETT

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DTSD. Returned 7/3/69

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RMIP/P(69)9

COPY NO 50

9th July 1969

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

RELEASE OF MILITARY INFORMATION POLICY COMMITTEE

RELEASE OF UNITED KINGDOM CLASSIFIED MILITARY  
INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES - TABLE 'X'

Note by the Secretaries

An up-to-date version of Table 'X' (Upper Limits for the Release of United Kingdom Classified Military Information to Countries other than the United States) is attached at Annex. This supersedes the version circulated under RMIP/P(67)10 dated 23rd October 1967.

(Signed) E.B. ABBOTTS  
G.F. SANDERS

DS13a: Ext 6377  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING  
WHITEHALL  
LONDON, S.W.1

UK EYES ONLY

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UK EYES ONLY

ANNEX TO RMLP/P(69)9

RMI TABLE 'X'

UPPER LIMITS FOR THE RELEASE OF UNITED KINGDOM  
CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO COUNTRIES  
OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES

GENERAL EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. When the political, military or commercial advantages of doing so appear to them to outweigh the security risks, the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Technology or Home Office (Civil Defence Department) may, subject to the provisos in paragraph 3 below, authorise the release to another Government or to an International Defence Organisation of classified United Kingdom military information of a higher classification than would be justified on security grounds alone.
2. The limits of Departments' discretion are set out in Columns (a) and (b) of Table 'X' attached. Where classification in Column (b) is higher than that in Column (a), the difference between Column (a) and Column (b) releases lies primarily in the stringency with which the criteria are applied. Releases under Column (b) (save for repetitive releases, eg, recurrent courses) are only to be made exceptionally and prior consultation will be more careful and detailed (involving more divisions, branches, etc, internally and more Departments externally) than is required for the normal Column (a) releases.
3. The Departments named in paragraph 1 may release information up to the levels shown in Columns (a) and (b) provided that:
  - (i) THE RECIPIENT GOVERNMENT OR INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE ORGANISATION HAS A NEED TO KNOW; AND
  - (ii) OTHER INTERESTED DEPARTMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE OWNING DEPARTMENT (WHERE DIFFERENT), AGREE
4. In addition to Columns (a) and (b) releases, the Ministry of Defence (through single-Service channels, if appropriate) may delegate to Commanders-in-Chief, Heads of Service Missions and Service Liaison Staffs, Service Attaches, Defence Advisers and Commandants of Service Schools authority to release to other Governments or International Defence Organisations classified military information up to and including the limits shown in Column (c) of Table 'X', subject to the two conditions mentioned in paragraph 3 above.
5. In considering whether to release classified information, Departments should remember that it would probably be further disseminated by the recipient Government or International Defence Organisation, subject to its own security regulations and compliance with the "Conditions of Release": when students attend UK courses, reliance has to be placed on the security clearance certificates issued by their Government or the International Defence Organisation to which they belong. For some indication of the risk from this and other forms of leak, the column headed "Level of release recommended or likely to be recommended by the Security Policy and Methods Committee on security grounds alone" should be consulted.
6. All proposals for the disclosure of information above the levels set out in Table 'X' or to Governments or International Defence Organisations not listed therein, should be submitted on RMI Form C to the RMI Secretariat.

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TABLE "X"

|                       | Country or Organisation<br>(References are to the Detailed Notes on pages 6 - 8) | Level of Release recommended or likely to be recommended by the SPMC on security grounds alone | Permitted Levels of Release agreed by the RMIPC |                |          |
|-----------------------|--|--|---|----------------|----------|
|                       |  |  | (a)   | (b)            | (c)      |
| <u>Commonwealth</u>   |  |  |   |                |          |
|                       | Australia  | TS   | TS  | TS             | S        |
|                       | Botswana (i)   | C  | C   | C              | C        |
|                       | Canada   | TS   | TS  | TS             | S        |
|                       | Ceylon   | R  | R   | C              | R        |
|                       | Cyprus   | R  | R   | R              | R        |
|                       | Ghana  | R  | R   | C              | R        |
|                       | India (ii)   | R  | C   | <del>C</del> C | C        |
|                       | Jamaica  | C  | C   | C              | C        |
|                       | Kenya  | C  | C   | C              | C        |
|                       | Lesotho (i)  | C  | C   | C              | C        |
|                       | Malawi   | C  | C   | C              | C        |
|                       | Malaysia (iii)   | C  | C   | S              | C        |
|                       | Malta (iv)   | C  | C   | C              | C        |
|                       | New Zealand  | TS   | TS  | TS             | S        |
|                       | Nigeria  | C  | C   | C              | C        |
|                       | Pakistan   | C  | C   | <del>C</del> C | C        |
|                       | Rhodesia   | -  | Nil   | Nil            | Nil      |
|                       | Sierre Leone   | R  | R   | C              | R        |
|                       | Singapore (iii)  | C  | C   | S              | C        |
|                       | Tanzania   | Nil  | Nil   | R              | Nil      |
|                       | The Gambia   | R  | R   | C              | R        |
|                       | Trinidad   | C  | C   | C              | C        |
|                       | Uganda   | R  | R   | C              | R        |
|                       | Zambia   | R  | R   | R              | R        |
|                       | <b>GUYANA</b>  | <b>R</b>   | <b>R</b>  | <b>R</b>       | <b>R</b> |
| <u>NATO/WEU</u>       |  |  |   |                |          |
|                       | NATO Commanders and Integrated Staffs<br>WEU Integrated Staffs                   | -  | S(v)  | (v)(vi)        | (v)(vii) |
| <u>NATO Countries</u> |  |  |   |                |          |
|                       | Belgium (xviii)  | <del>C</del> R   | C   | S              | C        |
|                       | Canada (see under Commonwealth)  |  |   |                |          |
|                       | Denmark  | C  | C   | S              | C        |
|                       | FR of Germany (viii)   | C  | C   | S              | C        |
|                       | France (ix)  | C  | C   | S              | C        |



UK EYES ONLY

TABLE "X" CONTINUED

|  | Country or Organisation<br>(References are to the Detailed Notes on Pages 6 - 8) | Level of Release recommended or likely to be recommended by the SPMC on security grounds alone | Permitted Levels of Release agreed by the RMIPC |     |     |
|--|--|--|---|-----|-----|
|  |  |  | (a)   | (b) | (c) |
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UK EYES ONLY

TABLE "X" (CONTINUED)

|   | Country or Organisation<br>(References are to the Detailed Notes on Pages 6 - 8) | Level of Release recommended or likely to be recommended by the SPMC on security grounds alone | Permitted Levels of Release agreed by the RMIPC |     |     |
|---|--|--|---|-----|-----|
|   |  |  | (a)   | (b) | (c) |
| TS = TOP SECRET<br>S = SECRET<br>C = CONFIDENTIAL<br>R = RESTRICTED |  |  |   |     |     |
| <u>Other Countries not in Soviet or Chinese Blocs (Cont'd)</u>      |  |  |   |     |     |
|   | Brunei (xvii)  | C  | C   | C   | C   |
|   | Austria  | R  | R   | C   | R   |
|   | Brazil   | R  | R   | C   | R   |
|   | Burma  | R  | R   | C   | R   |
|   | Chile  | R  | R   | C   | R   |
|   | Colombia   | R  | R   | C   | R   |
|   | Cuba   | Nil  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | UNION OF ARAB EMIRATES   | R  | R   | R   | R   |
|   | Ecuador  | Nil  | Nil   | R   | R   |
|   | Ethiopia   | Nil  | R   | C   | R   |
|   | Finland  | Nil  | Nil   | R   | R   |
|   | Indonesia  | Nil  | Nil   | R   | R   |
|   | Iraq   | Nil  | Nil   | R   | R   |
|   | Irish Republic   | C  | C   | C   | C   |
|   | Israel (xii)   | S  | S   | S   | C   |
|   | Japan  | C  | C   | C   | R   |
|   | Jordan   | Nil  | R   | C   | R   |
|   | Korea (Republic of)  | Nil  | Nil   | R   | R   |
|   | Kuwait   | R  | R   | C   | R   |
|   | Lebanon  | Nil  | R   | R   | R   |
|   | Libya  | Nil  | R   | C   | R   |
|   | Mexico (xiii)  | Nil  | Nil   | R   | R   |
|   | Morocco  | R  | R   | C   | R   |
|   | Peru   | C  | C   | C   | R   |
|   | Saudi Arabia   | R  | C   | C   | R   |
|   | South Africa (xiv)   | S  | S   | S   | S   |
|   | Spain (xv)   | R  | C   | C   | R   |
|   | Sudan  | Nil  | Nil   | R   | R   |
|   | Sweden   | C  | C   | S   | C   |
|   | Switzerland  | C  | C   | S   | C   |
|   | Syria  | Nil  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | Tunisia  | Nil  | Nil   | R   | Nil |
|   | U.A.R.   | Nil  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | Uruguay  | Nil  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | Venezuela  | R  | R   | C   | R   |
|   | Yugoslavia (xvi)   | Nil  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |



UK EYES ONLY

TABLE "I" (CONTINUED)

|   | Country or Organisation<br>(References are to the Detailed Notes on Pages 6 - 8) | Level of Release recommended or likely to be recommended by the SPMC on security grounds alone | Permitted Levels of Release agreed by the RMIPC |     |     |
|---|--|--|---|-----|-----|
|   |  |  | (a)   | (b) | (c) |
| TS = TOP SECRET<br>S = SECRET<br>C = CONFIDENTIAL<br>R = RESTRICTED |  |  |   |     |     |
| <u>Soviet and Chinese Bloc Countries</u>                            |  |  |   |     |     |
|   | Albania  | -  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | Bulgaria   | -  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | China  | -  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | Czechoslovakia   | -  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | East German Zone   | -  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | Hungary  | -  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | North Korea  | -  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | North Vietnam  | -  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | Poland   | -  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | Rumania  | -  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | Tibet  | -  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |
|   | USSR   | -  | Nil   | Nil | Nil |



**SECRET**

UK EYES ONLY

DETAILED NOTES

- (i) Departments should bear in mind the likelihood of leakage of information to South Africa.
- (ii) Particular attention is drawn to the SPMC's recommendation based on the State of Security assessment (SM(0)(FM)(69)41) that the upper limit for normal release of classified information to India should be RESTRICTED. The RMIPC, taking other factors also into account, has decided that the higher levels shown in columns (a) and (b) may be used by Departments. The latter should also bear in mind that, whilst there must be some reduction in releases owing to the unfavourable security report and in particular to the strongly suspected penetration by the Russian Intelligence Service of Indian Government Departments and the Armed Services, the withholding of the types of UK information they have come to expect will be readily apparent to the Indians, thereby raising political difficulties. For that reason, the reduction in such releases will be kept to the minimum, having regard also to the varying sensitivity of the information. When it is proposed to refuse to India information of a kind hitherto made available, notwithstanding that she still has a need to know, it may be necessary to refer to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and/or Ministers before a decision is taken.
- (iii) a. Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) have discretion to release to the Federation of Malaysia and to Singapore intelligence information up to SECRET.
- b. The UK High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur, is authorised to release to the Federation of Malaysia, on a strict need-to-know basis, information up to SECRET.
- c. The UK High Commissioner, Singapore, is authorised to release to Singapore on a strict need-to-know basis, information up to SECRET.
- d. C-in-C Far East has discretion to release to the Federation of Malaysia and to Singapore combined (Navy/Army/Air Force) planning information up to SECRET.
- (iv) Departments are authorised to release to Malta such SECRET information as is necessary to meet HMG's obligations under the Mutual Defence and Assistance Agreement.
- (v) Releasing authorities should bear in mind the risk that any SECRET/ TOP SECRET information released may become known to representatives from member countries with a low security level.
- (vi) TOP SECRET provided the information is protected by the COSMIC(NATO) or FOCAL (WEU) procedures.

- 6 -

UK EYES ONLY

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

UK EYES ONLY

- (vii) The Service Departments may delegate to United Kingdom Commanders-in-Chief of Forces under the Command of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Command Atlantic and under other appropriate NATO Commands the discretion to pass United Kingdom information, including intelligence information, up to TOP SECRET within the Command. COSMIC procedures should be used whenever applicable. (The rules for COSMIC Procedures are laid down in CM(55)15(Final) dated 31st July 1964).
- (viii) Although Germany is grouped with the other NATO countries, Departments should bear in mind the seriousness of the threat to classified information passed to the Federal German Authorities and to the special procedures which are required for certain papers.
- (ix) The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have stated that, although the state of French security on the whole justifies the retention of Confidential in Column (a), there are doubts about the effectiveness of the protection which the French would be able to afford to UK classified information. In view of these, and the change in France's attitude to the Alliance, Departments should now apply very strictly the criterion of whether it is in the interests of the United Kingdom to allow any particular release.
- (x) CONFIDENTIAL provided that the information is protected by the SEATO security procedures contained in the SEATO Security Manual of December 1962 (reference V(2-2)). UK representatives to SEATO have discretion to release SECRET information in exceptional cases, provided that: (a) they reach agreement with the Australian and New Zealand Delegations, (b) that a definite need-to-know is established and (c) that SEATO security procedures are followed. (The member countries of SEATO are: Australia, New Zealand, France, Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, UK and US).
- (xi) CONFIDENTIAL provided that the information is protected by the CENTO security procedures (C/13/D5 of 8.4.65). UK representatives to CENTO have discretion to release SECRET information in exceptional cases provided that: (a) a definite need-to-know is established, and (b) that CENTO security procedures are followed. (The member countries of CENTO are:- Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and UK).
- (xii) Departments should consult the Foreign and Commonwealth Office before releasing to the Israelis information on (a) offensive weapons; (b) any equipment which might assist them in developing nuclear weapons and systems or vehicles for delivering such weapons; (c) any arms which would substantially increase the level of sophistication of their current weapons.
- (xiii) The state of security in Mexico would strictly not merit a classification above NIL in Columns (b) and (c). But when there are commercial advantages in doing so information up to RESTRICTED may be released, subject to the condition that material will only be passed to those Mexican officials (as few as possible) who are considered by the Defence Attache to be trustworthy and to whom he has explained that the RESTRICTED classification means that the material may not be passed outside Mexican Government circles.

UK EYES ONLY

**SECRET**



UK EYES ONLY

- (xiv) Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Technology have discretion (subject to the normal rules of consultation) to release classified information up to TOP SECRET appropriate to consultations between the UK and South African Naval Authorities concerned with plans for the defence of the sea routes in the area, or up to SECRET relating to British equipment in service with the South African Forces or approved by the AWP for sale to South Africa. In other cases the Foreign and Commonwealth Office should be consulted.
- (xv) Departments should consult the Foreign and Commonwealth Office before releasing any classified military information to Spain.
- (xvi) No classified information may be given to these countries except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc.
- (xvii) *Until November 1970, when the 1959 Agreement will expire, Departments are authorised to release to Brussels such Confidential information as is necessary to meet HM G's obligations under that Agreement.*
- (xviii) *Attention is drawn to the SPMC recommendation based on the state of security assessment (SM(O)PM)(69)(2A) that the level for normal release of classified information should be restricted. The RMIPC taking Belgium's NATO responsibilities into account, has decided that the higher levels in columns (a) (b) & (c) should be retained but Departments should bear in mind the continuing weakness in Belgium's Security Organisation.*

UK EYES ONLY



*Mr Owens,*  
I hope that those  
vacancies can be offered  
to Iraqi cadets if at all  
possible.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 27  
3 APR 1970  
DT33/359/1.

1227/2

DWF E 038/02 LKS 088/02

RR FCO

GRS 75

CYPHER CAT A

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO MOD LONDON

TELEGRAM NO FXH/RLH 020635Z 2ND APRIL 1970

RESTRICTED.

ADDRESSED TO MOD LONDON AND MOD ARMY.

IRAQI DMT HAS REQUESTED THE FOLLOWING VACANCIES ON RMA SANDHURST AND MONS OCS COURSES:

A. RMA COURSES NO 50 AND 51 - TWO VACANCIES ON EACH.

B. MONS OCS COURSES NO 47 AND 49 - TWO VACANCIES ON EACH.

2. IT IS ASSUMED THAT VACANCIES ON ENGLISH LANGUAGE COURSES AT ASE BEACONSFIELD WILL AUTOMATICALLY BE INCLUDED WITH ANY VACANCIES GRANTED.

3. DMT HAS REQUESTED EARLY NOTIFICATION OF ANY ACCEPTANCES SO AS TO PREPARE HIS CANDIDATES.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO MOD LONDON.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

DISTRIBUTED TO  
SENT M.O.D. ✓  
HD. OF DEFENCE DEPT. (2)  
HD. OF P.U.S.D.  
P.U.S.D.  
PERSONNEL OPS. DEPT.  
HD. OF COMINS. DEPT.  
EXAMINERS  
FILE R.K. 129 NEA



SECRET

Reference NEJ 10/6


Mr. A.T. Smith, Defence Department.

Military Courses in the U.K. for Arabs.

(Behind)

⑤.  
Captain Collett's minute of 5 March to Mr. MacRae on this subject. I regret that this file has remained inactive since then.

2. Capt. Collett clarified our problem, but did not solve it. Our point is that there is a strong political case for greater flexibility than the RMIPC paper allows in providing places on Staff Courses for Iraqis and others. This could be achieved either (less satisfactorily) by special ad hoc clearance from the RMIPC for each case, giving more weight than hitherto to political arguments, or by the sort of arrangement of Staff Courses which prevailed in the past. Capt. Collett says that this system has recently been changed. Why was this done? Were the undesirable consequences foreseen?
3. We should therefore be grateful if (pace para. 2 of Capt. Collett's minute) you could take up the matter with the M.O.D. again. You will notice that Mr. Arthur is ready to follow this through if we do not achieve some improvement at departmental level. (his minute on f.2)
4. The arguments in favour of accepting Iraqis and others on suitable courses are set out in para. 4 of Mr. Balfour-Paul's letter at f.1, and the arguments against a too restrictive security attitude <sup>are</sup> at paras. 5 and 6 of the letter. It could also be argued that the security risks of leakage



File A

File B



leakage through training courses are considerably less than that through the release of documents or equipment to unsuitable recipients.

5. We should also be grateful to see copies of the papers mentioned in Mr. Balfour-Paul's paragraph 2.


Page B

*C.W. Long*

(C.W. Long)

Near Eastern Department


23 April, 1970.





*pa w,*

# CYPHER



RR BAGHDAD GROUPS 45

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE MOD ARMY

TO BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER 111620Z MAY

RESTRICTED.

ROUTINE 111620Z MAY

FM MOD ARMY

TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD.

BT


R E S T R I C T E D RLH/RLI SUBJECT PD VACANCIES RMAS/MONS OCS PD  
REF YOUR FXH/RLH 010800Z MAY 70 PD FIRST PD WILL NOT KNOW RESULT OF  
BIDS UNTIL AFTER CONFERENCE TO ALLOCATE VACANCIES ON 13 MAY 70 PD  
SECOND PD COPY OF AT4 LETTER GIVING COURSE DATES FOR 1971 WILL BE  
SENT TO YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE PD

BT

NNNN



Mr Seaman, Defence Dept



This has just come to me  
from my Registry.

We do not have copies of the  
documents for which you asked.

As they are MOD pp., which the  
Ambassador has probably been  
shown by his D.A. perhaps your  
department has then or could  
set copies for MOD?

2. We have now been reminded  
by Baghdad in the confidence  
that they are helping for news  
on this subject. So we shd be very  
watchful for any substantive reaction  
from you.

This

Channing  
MED 11/5



This has been badly delayed.  
To hasten matters I have  
discussed with Mr Abbott, DS13,  
MOD, whether the RMIPC would  
agree to reconsider the Iraqi  
application. If not, to call  
a special meeting to consider  
the political case for making an  
exception <sup>or</sup> for amending the  
Cambridge <sup>RAF</sup> Courses to fit the  
confidential lectures into ~~the~~ an  
additional term from which Iraqis  
(& other restricted countries) would  
be excluded, thereby allowing for their  
participation in the rest of the course.  
He asked me to confirm  
and I have now drafted the  
attached letter which should issue  
soon.

Mr Long informed of Beamman.  
11/5

TBU. 19 May



CONFIDENTIAL

DOR 1(A)

DD Sy1

RECEIVED IN  
DS 13/10/10 No. 27  
26 MAY 1970

Copy to Mr E A F Seamar, FCO (without attachment-your NE 10/6 of 12 May refers)

DT33/389/1.

ATTENDANCE OF IRAQI STUDENTS ON ARMY AND RAF STAFF COLLEGE COURSES

At their meeting on 19th September 1969 the RMIPC upheld the objections of the RMI Sub-Committee to the attendance of an Iraqi Officer on the RAF Staff College Course. In the attached letter the FCO has asked if the Committee would, for political reasons, take a further look at the question to see whether there can be a change of view as regards Iraqi attendance at both Bracknell and Camberley.

2. We would not wish to go out to the full Committee if you were of the view that this is a non-starter. I should therefore be glad if you could let me have your early comments on this and on the feasibility of the suggestion in paragraph 6 of the letter that Confidential subjects might be confined to a separate term.

3. The point about the Sudan mentioned in paragraph 6 will be dealt with separately

19 May 1970

E B ABBOTTS  
DS 13a Ext 6194  
MOD Main Building

*copy sent  
over  
27/5*

*Copy Mr Hinchcliffe (NE Dept)*

*27 May 70*

*EJH  
20/5*

*I spoke to DS 13 (Miss Saunders) No decision has yet been reached but she will ask members of RMIPC to hasten their replies*

*By June 8*

*WJH  
27/5*

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL


DT 33/359/1.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1  
Telephone: 01-930 7022, ext.

Please address any reply to:  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

( DS 13a )  
and quote: DS13/709/19  
Your reference: NE 10/6

E A F Seaman, Esq  
Defence Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1



RN Staff College  
Lead in course  
28 Oct 1970-71  
2 June 1970

ATTENDANCE OF IRAQI STUDENTS ON ARMY AND RAF STAFF COLLEGE COURSES

Thank you for your letter of 12 May asking that further consideration be given to the attendance of Iraqi students on Staff College Courses.

The Army and Air Force Departments have reconsidered the matter in the light of the points that you made but remain opposed to the acceptance of Iraqi students at either Bracknell or Camberley. As has been pointed out, the interim security assessment on Iraq (SM(O)(PM)(67)47), issued since the question was raised in the RMIPC, indicates no improvement in Iraq's security and on the basis of that report the Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended a Nil level of release.

The security grading of the course is Confidential throughout and the suggestion in your paragraph 6 would not therefore be practicable. A special term with Secret content is in fact already held at Camberley for specially selected students.

In view of the above I do not therefore propose to put the matter to the full RMIPC.

I understand that you are considering withdrawing the question of Sudanese attendance.

I am copying this letter to Brigadier Vaux and Group Captain Laing.

Yours sincerely,

E B ABBOTTS

CONFIDENTIAL



(NE 10/6)

12 May, 1970.

Military Course in the U.K. for Arabs

We discussed the problem of including Iraqi (and other Arab country) applications for Camberley and R.A.F. staff courses in the United Kingdom which are graded confidential when Iraq and other Arab countries are not permitted access to higher than restricted information under the rules of the R.M.I.P.C.

2. We appreciate that the Committee are bound by the necessarily strict security rules when such applications are considered under the form 'C' procedure. Nevertheless we believe that an over rigid attitude to both the sale of sophisticated military equipment to Iraq and to the acceptance of Iraqis for staff and other specialised military training in the U.K. is to our disadvantage.

3. In almost all Arab countries the Armed Forces play a central political role. The only way of influencing the future key figures in them in our favour is by sending the spot men for high-grade training in the U.K. There is ample evidence, even in Ba'athist Iraq, that those in positions of military authority well disposed to us are in general those who have had such training in the course of their careers.

4. In the military, as in the civilian field the continuing partiality of Iraqis for British products (when these are not ruled out by price, delivery dates, etc.) depends on the maintenance of a reasonable flow of carefully chosen Iraqis being trained in their respective specialities by us.

5. The fact that the Iraqis, at any rate, have repeatedly expressed their readiness to pay the full fee for such courses is not irrelevant. Even at this strictly practical level some advantage would surely flow from the attendance of fee-paying Arabs on such courses in reasonable numbers and thus enabling us, at no extra cost to ourselves, to maintain in operation training establishments on a scale which would be useful for our contingency planning but which would otherwise be beyond our means.

E. B. Abbotts, Esq.,  
DS.13,  
Ministry of Defence.



**CONFIDENTIAL**

6. We should be glad to learn whether you would ask the R.M.I.P.C. to reconsider the Iraqi application in the light of the political case which we feel merits stretching the table 'X' rules. Should there be any difficulty, would it be possible, for example, to try to fit confidential subjects into a separate (fourth) term at Camberley, so that the Iraqis (and perhaps the Sudanese) could attend the other terms.

(E.A.F. Seaman)



Registry  
No. **NE 10/6**

**DRAFT** *letter*

Type 1 + **3**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
~~Secret.~~  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
~~Unclassified.~~

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

To:—

**Mr E B abbotts**

**DS 13**

**MWD**

From

**EAP Seaman**  
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

**Defence.**

Military course in the UK for  
Arabs.

We discussed the problem  
of including Iraqis (and other  
Arab countries) applications  
for Camberley and RHF  
Staff courses in the United  
Kingdom which are graded  
confidential when Iraq  
and other arab countries  
are not permitted to access  
to higher than restricted  
information under the  
rules of the R.M.I.P.C.



We appreciate that the Committee are bound by the necessarily strict security rules when such applications are considered under the form 'C' procedure. Nevertheless we believe that an over rigid attitude to both the sale of sophisticated military equipment to Iraq and to the acceptance of Iraqis for staff and other specialised military training in the U.K. is to our disadvantage.

[note A to B]

We should be glad to learn whether you would ask the RMIPC to reconsider the Iraqi application in the light of the political case which we feel merits making an exception stretching the table 'X' rules. Should there be any difficulty, would it be possible

for example, to try to fit confidential subjects into a separate (fourth) team at Canterbury, so that the Iraqis (and perhaps the Sudanese) could attend the other teams.



Mr Hinchcliffe (NED) now see Folio (13)

Pse see MOD letter of 2 June.

MOD have rejected our plea to allow Iraqi student attend Army & RAF Staff college courses as both the Army & Air Force Departments maintain their objection on security grounds.

We asked whether the courses to be rearranged to fit the confidential/secret parts to be put at the end of the respective courses but as we feared, this is not feasible.

In the circumstances I regret that we would find it difficult to make a case for including Iraqi candidates in these courses.

E J Seaman  
4/6/70.



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

|   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| <div>Registry<br/>DT 33/359/1</div> <div>SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</div> <div>Top Secret.<br/>Secret.<br/><u>Confidential.</u><br/>Restricted.<br/>Unclassified.</div> <div>PRIVACY MARKING</div> <div>.....In Confidence</div>   | <div>CONFIDENTIAL</div> <div>DRAFT</div> <div>To:—<br/>His Excellency<br/>Mr. H. G. Balfour Paul,<br/>British Embassy,<br/>BAGHDAD.</div> | <div>Type 1 +</div> <div>From<br/><br/>Mr. Tripp<br/>Telephone No. &amp; Ext.<br/><br/>Department</div> |
| <div><u>Military Courses in the UK</u><br/><u>for Arabs</u></div> <div><p>My letter NEQ 10/6 of 4 March was an interim reply to yours (10/4) of 5 February to Geoffrey Arthur.</p><p>2 I am sorry <del>to say that</del> I have no progress to report - rather the contrary. As you will see from the enclosed copy of a letter from the Ministry of Defence, despite <del>the</del> very strong case put up by Defence Department based on your letter, security objections to Arabs (especially Iraqis and Sudanis) attending confidential Staff College courses are still held to be paramount.</p><p>3 We are contesting this decision but with, <del>I fear,</del> little hope of ultimate success. I will let you know, if by some miracle, we can <sup>secure</sup> <del>engineer</del> a change of heart in the Ministry of Defence.</p><div>24/6</div></div> |   |   |
| <div>CONFIDENTIAL</div>   |   |   |



with (12)

Mr. Pooley, Defence Dept.


Attendance of Iraqi students on Staff College Courses

We are not at all happy at the implications ~~for~~ Anglo/Iraqi relations of the Ministry of Defence's decision, conveyed in Mr. Abbott's letter DS 13/709/19 of 2 June to Mr. Seaman, rejecting our plea to allow Iraqi students to attend Army and RAF Staff College courses.

2. I think that this is something which should be considered by a full meeting of the Release of Military Information Policy Committee. There are good political grounds for contesting this decision.

3. I attach a draft letter to the Head of DS 13a, which, if you agree should issue either from yourself or from Mr. Tesh.

(14)



(S. L. Egerton)  
Near Eastern Department  
24 June. 1970



COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Reference DT 33/359/1 WITH 12)

Mr. Egerton

Attendance of Iraqi Students  
on Staff College Courses

In view of your Ephemeral minute I agree that we should attack on a different front in contesting MOD's decision at folio 11.

2. I attach a draft minute which should issue from you to Mr. Pooley in Defence Department, covering a draft letter from either Mr. Pooley or Mr. Tesh to the Head of the Ministry of Defence Department concerned, asking MOD to allow this matter to be raised at the RMIPC.

3. I also attach a draft letter from Mr. Tripp to our Ambassador in Baghdad as a further follow-up to the interim reply we sent on 4 March (to his letter of 5 February, which originally raised this topic.)

*P. R. M. Hinchcliffe*

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)

NED

23 June, 1970.

Mr. Tripp

To see Dfts, especially  
Dft to HMA Baghdad below.

*Atkinson 23*  
*6*

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



Mr. Hinchcliffe Minutes

For. minutes below  
raises a tricky political  
problem within the amalga-  
mated FCO. I am not sure  
it is wise to have another  
go at the 'Commonwealth  
syndrome' which allows  
Pakistan access to Iug<sup>h</sup> up to  
Conf, & Iraq none; (Israel  
can get up to 5000!)  
Can we tackle it some other  
way, eg by reference to value



of potential Army  
Sales? M is over



— no hurry

With the compliments of

R  
22/6

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH  
OFFICE

Mr General

Mr Lyng

arr  
22/6

from 22/6

to me minutely

& then return

to me please

P.W. Hurrell

LONDON, S.W. 1

22/6



CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET

Mr. Egerton

Iraq - Release of Military  
Information

Folio 12  
Folio 11


Your manuscript minute with Folio 12 referring to the letter from Ministry of Defence at Folio 11.

2. Before we contest the MOD ruling (and I understand from Defence Department that we have very little chance of getting anywhere, even at a high level) it might be useful to sort out, within the Office, one of the more obvious anomalies connected with the whole question of security classification of and release of military information to other countries.

Folio 5

3. You will see from Table X under cover of Folio 5 that Iraq, on, allegedly, security grounds alone, is not allowed access to classified information of any kind, yet Pakistan, despite her friendly ties with China has <sup>automatic</sup> access to confidential information. Without having consulted South Asia Department, I would have thought that Chinese influence in Pakistan, if not up to that enjoyed by the Russians in Iraq, is not inconsiderable and I accordingly find it difficult to believe that as far as Pakistan is concerned the first column on page 2 of Table X is really based on security (rather than political - i.e. Commonwealth ties) alone.

4. You may wish to consider taking up with either PUSD or Security Department whether, in their view, it is solely security factors which determine the classification in column 2 and when we are clear on this point we might then be in a better position to challenge MOD's decision on Iraq.



(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)

NED

19 June, 1970.

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WKS

We can let this go  
until Mr. Kitchcliffe  
returns from leave on 16/6,  
I think. Then we should  
contest the MOD ruling in  
their letter on DT 33/359/1 of 2/6.  
① Mr. Long ② Mr. Makinson  
③ Mr. Kitchcliffe %r

Minute RMM  
19/6 JF 8/6



M. Seema

Reference

col 12

Iraqis at Camberley & RAF Staff courses

I spoke to Miss Sanders in D.S. 13 about your letter of 12 May.

2) Little action has yet been taken by B. D.S. 13 partly because they were waiting to coordinate some other papers relating to the Sudan and partly because they did not realise there was any particular urgency.

3) I suggested that she should, for now, pursue the matter just for Iraq. This she will do firstly by consulting the Army department and the R.A.F. department which run the courses. If they have no objections (which they may) then all RM/PC members will have to be consulted.

4) It may be that N.E.D. will wish to send an interim reply to Baghdad.

M. C. Hume  
18/5.



B. U. 26/5

Reference

26/5 (2)

Mr. Long (NE Dpts) Many thanks 26/5

Please see [7]

As MOD have not hurried to reply, we have asked the Secretary of the RMIPC to press members of the Committee for an early decision about Iraq's application for Cambridge & RAF courses.

It will take about 14 days before a final decision is taken but we will keep prodding.

You may wish to send an interim reply to Baghdad.

G. Heaman  
13/5/70.

BBV again 10 June.

Mr. Thirchcliffe

You sh<sup>d</sup> see, & decide whether an interim reply is wanted.

C. Long  
26/5

Mr. <sup>Senior.</sup> Long.

An interim reply to Cambridge

can wait (no time ago!) (File A). I

think we can now get another letter. BBV 10 June 70 (replied) New M. Hull 26/5.



Now see MOD reply which  
firmly rejects FCO plea to allow  
Iraqi students to attend Army & RAF  
Staff College courses on security  
grounds.

[ ]

E. J. Leaman  
5/6





CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

(DT 33/359/1)

24 June, 1970.

MILITARY COURSES IN THE UK FOR ARABS

My letter NEQ 10/6 of 4 March was an interim reply to yours (10/4) of 5 February to Geoffrey Arthur.

... 2. I am sorry I have no progress to report - rather the contrary. As you will see from the enclosed copy of a letter from the Ministry of Defence, despite the very strong case put up by Defence Department based on your letter, security objections to Arabs (especially Iraqis and Sudanis) attending confidential Staff College courses are still held to be paramount.

3. We are contesting this decision but with little hope of ultimate success. I will let you know, if by some miracle, we can secure a change of heart in the Ministry of Defence.

(J.P. Tripp)

His Excellency  
Mr. H.G. Balfour Paul, CMG,  
BAGHDAD

see (7)

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CONFIDENTIAL

Defence Department

14

(DT 33/359/1)

1 July, 1970.

Attendance of Iraqi Students on Army and  
R.A.F. Staff College Courses

Correspondence on this rests with Abbott's letter DS 13/709/19 of 2 June to Seaman. In our view the Army and Air Force Departments' decision not to allow prominent Iraqis to attend the Staff College courses will have two main effects:-

- (a) it will contribute towards the lessening of British influence at the centre of power in Iraq (paragraph 3 of Seaman's letter (NE 10/6) of 12 May to Abbott refers). The absence of high level courses in this country will persuade the Iraqis that they have no alternative but to rely on the Soviet bloc for their staff training;
- (b) it will lessen the prospects for selling British military hardware to Iraq. Many senior Iraqis continue to show partiality for British products, but this does depend, to a large extent, on a flow to this country of Iraqis being trained in their respective specialities by us. The fact that senior Iraqi officers can no longer come to this country for staff courses will be another factor towards encouraging them to look elsewhere - again to the bloc - for military supplies.

2. I appreciate the difficulties of arranging a special term at Bracknell or Camberley for Iraqi or other Arab students. Assuming, in view of Abbott's letter, that this is not a starter, an alternative suggestion that occurs to us is that in the case of well-placed and therefore influential (and potentially pro-British) Iraqi students who have been especially recommended for staff courses by our Ambassador in Baghdad, the RMIPC should

M. H. Tallboys, Esq.,  
Head of DS 13,  
Ministry of Defence.



**CONFIDENTIAL**

be given discretion to allow such students access to confidential information purely for the purpose of attending a Staff College course. In such cases we believe that the potential political advantages of having influential Iraqis on these courses would out-weigh the possible security disadvantages. I should accordingly be grateful if you could reconsider your decision not to put the matter to the full RMIPC.

3. We would like this item to be taken under "Any other business" at the RMIPC meeting on 6 July, for which reason I am enclosing ten copies of this letter for circulation.

(T.E.F. Pooley)



CONFIDENTIAL

Re: try

No. 33/359/1

**DRAFT**

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:—

M.H. Talbot  
Head of Ds 13d,  
Ministry of Defence

From

Mr. Pooley/Mr. Tesh

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Attendance of Iraqi Students on  
Army and RAF Staff College Courses

Correspondence on this rests with Abbott's letter DS 13/709/19 of 2 June to Seaman. In our view the Army and Air Force Departments' decisions not to allow prominent Iraqis to attend the Staff College courses will have two main effects:—

- (a) it will contribute towards the lessening of British influence at the centre of power in Iraq (paragraph 3 of Seaman's letter (NE 10/6) of 12 May to Abbott refers). The absence of high level courses in this country will persuade the Iraqis that they have no alternative but to rely on the Soviet bloc for their staff training;
- (b) it will lessen the prospects for selling British military hardware to Iraq. Many senior Iraqis continue to show partiality for British products, but this does depend, to a large extent, on a flow to this country of Iraqis being trained in their respective specialities by us. The fact that senior Iraqi officers can no longer come to this

/country

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



CONFIDENTIAL

country for staff courses will be another factor towards encouraging them to look elsewhere - again to the bloc - for military supplies.

2. I appreciate the difficulties of arranging a special term at Bracknell or Camberley for Iraqi or other Arab students. Assuming, in view of Abbott's letter, that this is not a starter, an alternative suggestion that occurs to us is that in the case of well-placed and therefore influential (and potentially pro-British) Iraqi students who have been especially recommended for staff courses by our Ambassador in Baghdad, the RMIPC should be given discretion to allow such students access to confidential information purely for the purpose of attending a Staff College course. In such cases we believe that the potential political advantages of having influential Iraqis on these courses would outweigh the possible security disadvantages. I should accordingly be grateful if you could reconsider your decision not to put the matter to the full RMIPC.

3. *We would like this item to be taken under "Army the business" as the RMIPC meets on 6 July, for which reason I am enclosing 10 copies of this letter for circulation.*

*SW*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL





CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building, Whitehall, London S.W.1

Telephone: 01-754 7000

REGISTRY No. 27

3 JUL 1970

2 JULY 1970

579/1

Our reference: DS 13/709/12  
Your reference: *etc.*

15  
RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 27  
3 JUL 1970  
DS 33/359/1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RELEASE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE POLICY COMMITTEE

ATTENDANCE OF IRAQI STUDENTS ON ARMY AND RAF STAFF COLLEGE COURSES

The attached letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is circulated for consideration under Item 5 of the Agenda for the meeting to be held on 6 July 1970

*C F Sanders*  
(MISS G F SANDERS)

- To: Mr A D Harvey  
Mr M H Tallboys  
Mr H E Davies  
Mr T E F Pooley ✓  
Mr M M J Gannon  
Mr D G Purnell  
Commander T D Hanley  
Commander R A H Vaughan-Cox  
Brigadier P A L Vaux  
Brigadier J I Purser  
Group Captain N W Wakelin  
Group Captain F A Thomas  
Mr H P Goodwyn  
Mr E B Abbetts

*with attached - Tom DT 33/359/17  
11-17*

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr Egan NED.

16

Attendance of Iraqi Students on Army and RAF  
Staff College Courses

This matter was discussed at the RMIPC meeting on 6 July when I put the political grounds for accepting specially selected senior officers for staff courses.

2. The meeting were unanimously against altering the security classification for the release of information to Iraq. When I suggested that we might make exceptions for somebody who was specially selected, all three Services said that their staff courses for foreigners are confidential. A secret element of the course is kept quite separate from the rest. It was decided last year that it was impossible to continue having separate courses for foreigners, nor is it possible to extract the confidential information and exclude certain foreigners from certain parts of the course. All members of the course need to be given certain written confidential information during the course and they all go on visits to establishments and firms where confidential information ~~on~~ material is disclosed. There therefore appears to be no way in which we can arrange for such staff courses to be altered to suit candidates who cannot be given confidential information.

3. It was suggested that perhaps alternative courses might be offered to the Iraqis. However, I see little point in following this suggestion up as we wish to train the more senior officers and any course they do attend must almost certainly be confidential if it is to be worth while at all. If we have to refuse the Iraqis a staff course we can of course say with truth that the Army Staff College has no vacancies before 1975. (Admittedly we could press the Army to give priority to certain countries, including Iraq, but they have already planned to fill their vacancies from elsewhere up to 1974 inclusive.) The RAF Staff College have no forecast beyond next year where they are already full.

*T.E.F. Pooley*  
(T.E.F. Pooley)  
Defence Department  
7 July 1970

*And PMMM*  
017

Mr Hinchcliffe

Disappointing but not unexpected. We  
shd. now inform Baghdad, following up Mr Triggs  
letter of 24/6 below. *NE 13/7*



Reference  
RESTRICTED  
covering  
CONFIDENTIAL

DT 33/359/1

17

Mr. Egerton & 14/7

Attendance of Iraqi Students on  
Staff College Courses

1 agree | You asked for a draft letter to go from Mr. Tripp to our Ambassador in Baghdad confirming that the Ministry of Defence were not prepared, for security reasons, to allow the attendance of Iraqi students on Army and R.A.F. Staff College Courses. I have not gone into the arguments produced by the Ministry of Defence in defence of their decision as I do not think it would be useful to become involved in a debate with Baghdad on the nuts and bolts of this case. A decision has been made, we are not in a position to change it, so we should now accept it gracefully.

2. I attach a draft letter.

*P. R. M. Hinchcliffe*

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)

13 July, 1970.

~~Mr. Tripp~~

dy to issue.  
J.S.7

RESTRICTED



CONFIDENTIAL

v 17

Letter  
DT 33/359/1

TO

FROM

His Excellency,  
Mr. H. G. Balfour Paul,  
C.M.G.,  
Baghdad

J. P. Tripp  
(Near Eastern  
Department)

Military Courses in the U.K. for  
Iraqis

I last wrote to you on this <sup>subject</sup> ~~topic~~ on  
24 June and I am sorry to say that the  
fears I expressed in paragraph 3 of that  
letter have proved to be <sup>only too well</sup> founded. The  
Ministry of Defence have stuck to their guns,  
despite a further strong plea from Defence  
Department.

2. If Iraqi servicemen apply to you for  
Staff College places you may tell them  
(<sup>truthfully</sup> ~~with truth~~) that the Army Staff College  
<sup>HAS</sup> ~~have~~ no vacancies (for anyone) before 1975,  
and the R.A.F. Staff College, who do ~~not~~  
forecast more than a year ahead, is full  
up for 1971.

12.7

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

FLAG A



17

CONFIDENTIAL



DT 33/359/1

Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

14 July, 1970

Military Courses in the U.K. for Iraqis

13

I last wrote to you on this subject on 24 June and I am sorry to say that the fears I expressed in paragraph 3 of that letter have proved to be only too well founded. The Ministry of Defence have stuck to their guns, despite a further strong plea from Defence Department.

2. If Iraqi servicemen apply to you for Staff College places you may tell them (truthfully) that the Army Staff College has no vacancies (for anyone) before 1975, and the R.A.F. Staff College, who do not forecast more than a year ahead, is full up for 1971.

(J. P. Tripp)

His Excellency,  
Mr. H. G. Balfour Paul, C.M.G.,  
Baghdad.

CONFIDENTIAL



PM/57/23/3

From: Miss K E Wood




MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1  
Telephone: ~~XXXXXX XXXX XXXX~~

REGISTRY No. 10

01-930 7022 Ext 7038

Our reference: DS8a/5/2  
Your reference:



P R M Hinchcliffe, Esq  
Near Eastern Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Whitehall, SW1

23 September 1970

Reg & Submit urgently.

Dear Mr Hinchcliffe

IRAQI AIR FORCE - TECHNICAL OFFICER TRAINING

The Iraqi Air Force has requested one vacancy on each of the following courses:

- a. No 53 Engineering Mechanical Officers  
from 19 April 1971 - 14 April 1972
- b. No 54 Engineering Mechanical Officers  
from 31 August 1971 - 28 July 1972
- c. No 23 Electrical and Instrument Officers  
from 19 April 1971 - 14 April 1972
- d. No 35 Armament Officers  
from 31 August 1971 - 28 July 1972

The highest security grading of these courses is RESTRICTED and places are available. I should be grateful to know if you have any objections to our accepting the Iraqi students.

Yours sincerely

K Wood

Defence Dept. (MA PACHE  
Mushane)

For defendant. MED has no objections - with  
the reserve.

P R M Hinchcliffe

6/10.



Registry  
No. *DT 33/359/1*

DRAFT

Type 1 +

*190*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

To:—

*17 OCT 1970*

*Miss K.G. Wood*

*Mod. 858*

*Main Building*

From

*W W Packe*

Telephone No. & Ext.

*1263.*

Department

*Defence*

*Training in U.K. - Iraq.*

*Would you please refer to your letter 858a/5/2 of 23 Sept. to Mr Hinchcliffe about the offer of places on technical training courses.*

*The Foreign and Commonwealth Office would have no objection to the attendance of Iraqi officers as proposed.*



Defence Department

19

DT 33/359/1

9 October, 1970

19  
Training in U.K. - Iraq

Would you please refer to your letter DS8a/5/2 of 23 September to Mr. Hinchcliffe about the offer to Iraq of places on technical training courses.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office would have no objection to the attendance of Iraqi Officers as proposed.

(W. W. PACKE)

Miss K. E. Wood,  
Ministry of Defence,  
DS 8,  
Main Building.



PM/83/10/8-1

From: Mr M Shortt

(20)



*M. Shortt*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1  
Telephone: WHITEhall 7022, ext. 6638

|  |
|--|
| RECEIVED IN<br>R. CLERY N. 27<br>18 DEC 1970<br><br>DT33/359/1 |
|--|

Our reference: D/DS8a/19/10  
Your reference: HU/328/06

*P. W. H. M.*

Miss P F Cotsford  
EIR2C2  
Ministry of Aviation Supply  
Stuart House  
Soho Square  
W1

15 December 1970

FIGHTER CONTROLLER TRAINING FOR IRAQ AIR FORCE

1. I am replying to your letter of 30 November to Miss Wood. As I explained to you over the telephone the other day, we have recently had a number of bids for Fighter Controller training from overseas countries and we could currently fill all our vacancies up to 1974. However, since you consider that the Iraqi requirement will only be 2 places, I think we could fit them in 1972 or more probably 1973. As you have pointed out in your letter RMIPC Clearance will be necessary and given the present state of affairs we would not oppose a C Form.
2. I am copying this letter to Hinchcliffe and Macpherson in the FCO.

*Last Paper*

M. SHORTT

Hidden copies to: Ops(GE)2a(RAF)  
ADT(F&C)(RAF)

RAF Sy 1b  
File 5/2



Training Of The Iraqi Army In The UK; Iraqi Students On Army And R.A.F. Staff College Courses.  
Training Of Armed Forces From Iraq In UK Under UK Military Training Scheme. 15 Dec. 1970.  
MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 46/535. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107456335/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=f3b6cf25&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107456335/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=f3b6cf25&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.